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ABSTRACT 
Nearly all Cruiser Destroyer (CRUDES) ships deploy through potential piracy areas in 
the five-million square mile Fifth Fleet domain, which is why all Navy warships maintain 
Visit, Board, Search and Seizure (VBSS) shipboard teams.  This research analyzed 
advantages and disadvantages of the VBSS structure including alternative approaches to 
how the Navy could train, certify and deploy VBSS teams, e.g., Fifth Fleet detachments.  
Ship’s company VBSS teams face an unattractive tradeoff during deployment: 
concentrate on Navy Enlisted Code (NEC) and ratings training, and prioritize VBSS 
team-training.  School house training and certification are crucial yet insufficient for 
maintaining team-performance in accordance with required occupational capabilities 
(ROC) requirements.  Using VBSS detachments would reduce the total number of 
personnel needed to accomplish the VBSS mission.  If converting to detachments is 
improbable, then Navy Commanding Officers could better support their VBSS mission 
by prioritizing team training before and during deployment.  U.S. Marines, already well-
trained and embarked on amphibious ships could also accomplish this mission. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. AREA OF RESEARCH 
This research analyzed the current structure and process whereby the U.S. Navy 
conducts Maritime Interdictions Operations (MIO), specifically, the training and 
certification of shipboard personnel to conduct Visit, Board, and Search and Seizure 
(VBSS) operations primarily against piracy activities.  The study will describe current, 
U.S. Navy Ship’s Manning Documents (SMD) to ascertain the extent to which 
(primarily) Destroyer (DDG) platforms are best equipped/manned to support the growing 
mission of Maritime Interdictions Operations. Manpower and working requirements will 
be analyzed based on the knowledge, skills, and abilities (KSA) needed to operate and 
conduct MIO and VBSS. A potentially cheaper alternative will be considered, i.e., 
terminating shipboard teams and creating special VBSS detachments located only within 
the Fifth Fleet and AFRICOM.  
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This thesis focuses on the following objectives: 
1. Primary Question: 
 What are the current Visit Board Search and Seizure (VBSS) structure 
and process including work requirements and written representation in 
the Ship’s manpower document (SMD), and could VBSS non 
shipboard “detachments” be a viable alternative? 
2. Secondary Questions: 
 What are the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats when 
comparing the existing versus the alternative program? 
C. DISCUSSION 
Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO) has migrated from a secondary mission 
to a primary mission of today’s surface Navy fleet. Examined will be how the U.S. Navy 
trains, certifies the shipboard VBSS teams to accomplish emerging piracy and counter-
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interdiction requirements.  Ships have been conducting VBSS during operations up to 
level III (non-compliant boardings) since about 2004. These ship’s forces teams consist 
of 18–21 enlisted and officer members from a wide array of ratings and skill-sets.  VBSS 
team member meet specified prerequisites prior to attending the following special 
schools:  Security Reaction Force-Basic (SRF-B), Security Reaction Force-Advanced 
(SRF-A), and Non-Compliant Boarding (NCB) School. This training pipeline lasts about 
eight weeks total, with officer and select boarding team members attending an additional 
two weeks, Boarding Officer School and Breacher School. 
The members of VBSS teams are billeted to each ship to fill a requirement and 
are expected to conduct work in that specific billet per the Navy standard workweek. A 
concern to be addressed in the study is increasing workload, i.e., the efficacy of standing 
eight hours of watch per day plus two hours of maintenance, plus other shipboard 
evolutions, plus VBSS operations.  To be accurate, VBSS members are typically 
removed from watch bills to conduct VBSS boarding requirements.  To fill the voids left 
by VBSS team members, ship’s company simply works overtime and/or stands more 
watches, and/or conducts more maintenance. In short, because the hours lost due to MIO 
or VBSS are not configured into the Navy’s standard work week underway, the amount 
of work each sailor has to do on average is increased.  
Creating VBSS detachments in Fifth Fleet and the Horn of Africa would free 
ship’s company to work in their assigned billets, and more accurately align workload 
with the Navy’s published standard workweek.  The quality of using detachments is 
addressed later.   
D. BENEFIT OF STUDY 
This study concluded in favor of implementing specialized VBSS detachments in 
the world’s hot spots and relieving shipboard teams of VBSS requirements.  In sum, 21 
sailors per ship, previously distracted from their primary rating and skill-set would be 
able to focus on shipboard requirements, and the Navy standard workweek would return 
to closer accuracy.  Fewer numbers of VBSS members will be needed, trained and 
certified should the Navy decide to switch to a detachment structure.  As current 
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shipboard VBSS teams gradually lose VBSS skills during a deployment (perishable skills 
if not used regularly), dedicated VBSS detachments may be safer and more effective, i.e., 
that is all they would do.  This study identified additional manpower issues associated 
with the current MIO and VBSS mission.  It is worth noting that an earlier VBSS 
detachment proposal failed to gain sufficient interest.  This study may serve to reactivate 
that proposal. 
E. METHODOLOGY 
Various books, magazine articles, CD-ROM systems, and other library 
information resources on maritime security were reviewed. VBSS protocols and policies, 
schooling requirements, personal qualifications, and standards were also reviewed. 
Finally, conducting VBSS requirements at different levels was analyzed. 
F. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
Chapter I: The introduction identifies the focus and purpose of the research as 
well as primary and secondary research questions.  
Chapter II is an overview of Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO) and Visit, 
Board, Search, and Seizure (VBSS) operations.  It outlines the current state of the fleet 
commensurate with Navy maritime and strategic goals. It examined the ROC/POE 
requirements and compared the hours required to conduct MIO and VBSS missions with 
the SMD.  
Chapter III uses a strategic analysis tool of depicting the Strengths, Weaknesses, 
Opportunities, and Threats (SWOT) of the current VBSS program versus a proposed 
VBSS detachments alternative program.    
Chapter IV provides a summary, conclusion and recommendations, and 
suggestions for further research. 
 4
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II. OVERVIEW OF MIO AND VBSS  
A. MARITIME INTERDICTION OPERATIONS 
Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO) is a major part of the Navy’s strategic 
goals and has been conducting maritime security operations from the birth of the United 
States Navy. The DoD receives funding from Congress in support of Navy missions as 
part of the National Security Strategy (NSS) and National Military Strategy (NMS).  The 
Required Operation Capabilities (ROC) and Projected Operational Environments (POE) 
accomplish these missions by platform. In the 2012 Highlights of the Department of the 
Navy, from the Budget Office of the Navy, they outlined,  
Our cooperative maritime strategy articulates the six core capabilities of 
forward presence, deterrence, sea control, power projection, maritime 
security, and humanitarian assistance/disaster response that our naval 
forces provide to ensure the security and prosperity of our nation and its 
people.1 
Maritime security and sea control are broader categories of MIO. IT appears the 
current political will continue the Navy’s current security role. High Sea piracy the past 
ten years has become more daring and the United States will lead the global community 
to deter these attacks in support of free transit lanes for all vessels on the high seas.  This 
idea of free transit across the globe’s waterways is not new and has been the foundation 
which the United States Navy has strived to protect from its beginning.  
Maritime Interdiction Operations involve many different operations; they are not 
just anti-piracy operations. MIO include U.N. sanction enforcement, this keeps countries 
that have had sanctions imposed against them, and therefore the U.S. Navy assists in the 
enforcement of illegal smuggling of contraband inbound or outbound to a country. This 
enforcement often involves numerous boardings by existing VBSS teams. The process of 
determining which ships to query and board is usually determined by some sort of 
intelligence but many times simply involves teams approaching countless vessels and 
                                                 
1 Office of Budget, Department of the Navy, “Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2012 
Budget,” February 2011, http://www.finance.hq.navy.mil/FMB/12pres/Highlights_book.pdf. 
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conducting queries.  These operations named approach operations and intended to build 
relationships with local fisherman and let them know the U.S. Navy was there to assist. 
These approach operations often involved the dissemination of various support, first-aid 
kits, bottle water, food, and other items, the items contained how to contact the U.S. 
Navy if they were under attack from pirates or in need of assistance. These relationships 
built with local fisherman by the U.S. Navy, recently came into the media with the 
freeing of 13 Iranian fishermen from Somalia pirates. The following is a small portion 
from the article from the Associated Press article by Lolita C. Baldor, 
American forces flying off the guided-missile destroyer USS Kidd 
responded to a distress call from the Iranian vessel, the Al Molai, which 
had been held captive for more than 40 days, the U.S. Navy said Friday. 
The Kidd was sailing in the Arabian Sea, after leaving the Persian Gulf, 
when it came to the sailors' aid. 
A U.S. Navy team boarded the ship Thursday and detained 15 suspected 
Somali pirates. They had been holding the 13-member Iranian crew 
hostage and were using the boat as a "mother ship" for pirating operations 
in the Persian Gulf. 2 
This incident occurred days after the Iranian government threatened to cut off transit of 
the Strait of Hormuz to the U.S. These kinds of operations are not only a military 
operation but also serve as civil military relations. These boarding teams also help 
alleviate the fears among legitimate seafarers and invoke trust and cooperation with the 
United States.  
B. VISIT BOARD SEARCH AND SEIZURE (VBSS) 
The Navy has been conducting VBSS operations from its infancy, back in the 
revolutionary war the fighting was done by all the sailors onboard but later the work was 
transferred to the United States Marine Corps. The Navy oversaw a select few these 
sailors with specialized training, later marines, whose primary job was fighting. These 
Marines were the ones that met the challenges of combat aboard ships upon the high seas. 
In the modern age of this highly technological, advanced U.S. Navy there are no other 
                                                 
2 Lolita C. Baldor, Associated Press, “USS Kidd rescues Iran boat from pirates,” January 6, 
2012,http://www.wlfi.com/dpps/military/uss-kidd-rescues-iran-boat-from-pirates_4033438. 
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means that the Navy possesses to enforce sanctions and international law and continue to 
keep open these sea lines on commerce. The ability for countries to transit freely across 
the waters on our globe has been recently threatened by new age pirates. Later on in this 
chapter will discuss how this holds true for today’s navy as well.  
1. Past Boarding Teams 
Today’s boarding teams training programs are a drastic improvement from those 
offered a few years ago. Since the 1980s and 1990s sailors from Navy ships volunteered 
to climb containers while carrying a weapon.  These volunteers officially became 
members of their ship’s boarding teams. There was no rhyme or reason to the selection 
process nor was there any team qualification or school requirement.  The ship basically 
gathered up a mixture of armed sailors, launched a rigged hull inflatable boat (RHIB), 
and boarded vessels verifying compliance with the prescribed paperwork. There was no 
hazardous duty pay, allowance equipment list (AEL), or training in place to ensure that 
these sailors possessed the demanding training required to conduct such a high-risk 
evolution. The Navy realized that it needed to design a training program to give VBSS 
more legitimacy. The high seas were becoming a highway for terrorists to move illegal 
contraband. The terrorists were merciless in completing this mission therefore the U.S. 
Navy had to begin training its VBSS teams to a higher level to better confront such 
adversaries. Was training sailors the right people to give this mission to or would there be 
another group of persons that would be a better fit for this mission? The Navy finally 
formalized this training, 
Managed by the Center for Security Forces (CENSECFOR) in Norfolk, 
Va., formal VBSS training was created following the Gulf War in 1990 as 
a way to standardize and continue the Maritime Interception Operations 
introduced there as a result of UN resolutions "The course was designed to 
standardize what was previously done through on-the-job training and 
pass down," said Kurt Martin, anti-terrorism program manager for 
CENSECFOR. "We introduced the curriculum in 1998 and updated it in 
2005 to reflect what the teams would be facing in the fleet."3 
                                                 
3 Ed Barker, Naval Education and Training Command Public Affairs, “VBSS: Evolving the Mission,” 
Story number: NNS090425-03, April 25, 2009 http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=44692. 
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The Center for Security Forces developed the current training program for the 
schoolhouse that is used throughout the fleet.  
2. Current Boarding Teams 
The Navy has completely changed the training and qualifications process for 
today’s boarding teams since first implemented. The following paragraphs will outline 
the selection process of boarding team members and the training requirements they will 
have to complete prior to become a fully-qualified boarding team member for their ship.  
a. Security Reaction Force- Basic (SRF-B) 
The SRF-B is the first school that sailors who are selected for the VBSS 
team are sent to. This school is two weeks in length and introduces the sailors to a myriad 
of non-lethal weapons training, lethal weapons training, and other items outlined by 
OPNAVINST 3591.1F. This is the official description of Armed Sentry/Security 
Reaction Force (Basic) (AS/SRF-B) (A-830-0018). 
Course graduates will be able to perform the duties and responsibilities of 
an armed sentry for controlling access to U. S. Navy assets. Students will 
learn to implement immediate actions to identify, assess, track and deter 
potential threats, utilizing and demonstrating the proper tactics, techniques 
and procedures of the Use of Force Continuum along with proper 
implementation of Force Protection procedures, watch standing techniques 
and be capable of interacting with security reaction forces as a basic 
reaction force team member. This is a High-Risk course of instruction, and 
training consists of Oleoresin Capsicum (OC) pepper spray as well as live 
fire of the 9 mm pistol, 12-gauge shotgun, and M-16 rifle. All courses of 
fire used for this course are specified in OPNAVINST 3591.1F 
(Attachment K).4 
SRF-B is now taught onboard ships by ship’s company in accordance with 
OPNAVINST 3591.1F. Upon completion of SRF-B, students are sent to Security 
Reaction Force—Advanced. The advanced course is not currently offered afloat causing 
sailors have to go to schools at another site. Security Reaction Force- Advanced (SRF-A). 
                                                 
4 Statement of work for Instructional support in the Western Region for Navy Forces Training under the 
Direction of the Center for Security Forces, September 1, 
2009http://cryptome.quintessenz.at/mirror/dodi/navsec-sow.pdf. 
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The SRF-A school is often taught by companies that bid to win the 
contract and follow the requirements outlined in OPNAVINST 3591.1F. This is the 
official description of Armed Sentry/Security Reaction Force (Advanced) (AS/SRF-A) 
(A-830-0396). 
This course allows personnel to perform as a Naval Security Force team 
member. This team will act to prevent threats, whether from the pier, 
small boat, or any other means of penetrating a unit. This course will also 
train personnel to perform as a Naval Security Force team leader. In this 
position, the Team Leader will manage a security force team through 
assignment of members, ensure members receive necessary training, and 
coordinate team responses and perimeters. The Team Leader will also be 
able to conduct briefs and debriefs for the team and the Chain of 
Command. Course includes Operational Risk Management; Tactical Team 
Movements; Tactical Team Leadership; Tactical Communications; Use of 
Force and Deadly Force; Personnel Restraint Devices; Force Protection 
Search Procedures; Tactical Team Management; Tactical Mission 
Planning; and Standard Operating Procedures. Instructors will have to 
meet the Navy qualifications on the 9mm pistol and re-qualify semi-
annually in accordance with OPNAVINST 3591.1F (Attachment K).5 
The instructors for SRF-A are usually highly skilled individuals with 
numerous experiences in combat; it is not unusual for the instructors to be former 
SEALS, Army Rangers, Marine Recon, and other elite military members which offer 
better instruction because of real-life combat experience. Upon graduation from SFR-A 
sailors are sent Non-Compliant Boarding school, commands are encouraged to send their 
sailors in six plus man teams so they will able to train within the teams they will be 
operating in the Fleet.  
b. Non-Compliant Boarding, Visit, Boarding, Search, and Seizure 
(NCB VBSS) 
The NCB VBSS School is taught by the same companies that teach SRF-
B, SRF-A and Boarding Officer schools. This school is no different than the previous 
schools, they follow the requirements outlined in OPNAVINST 3591.1F. This is the 
official description for of Non-Compliant Boarding, Visit, Boarding, Search, and Seizure 
(NCB VBSS) (A-830-0395). 
                                                 
5 Ibid. 
 10
This course is designed to prepare Shipboard Boarding Teams and 
Boarding Officers (BO) to perform Visit, Board, Search, and Seizure 
(VBSS) procedures (Compliant and Non-Compliant Low Freeboard) in 
support of Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO). The course provides 
Safety; Water Survival; Use of Force/Deadly Force Policy; Physical 
Training/Defensive Tactics; Equipment Familiarization/Gear Issue; 
Compliant Boarding; Non-Compliant Boarding; Knot-Tying Techniques; 
Service Pistol, Rifle, and Shotgun Tactical Shooting; Caving Ladder 
Climbing; Rappelling and Containerized Inspection; Tactical Movements; 
Document Inspection, Verification and Intelligence Gathering; Underway 
Ship Boarding; Non-Lethal Weapons; Mission Planning; Effective 
Communications; Combat First Aid; and Prisoner Escort. The culmination 
of this training is an evaluated non-compliant boarding scenario involving 
boarding an afloat target. This course is designated as High Risk.6 
The training evolution is High Risk and the final phase most boarding 
team members complete in order to become full-fledged members of their ships VBSS 
team.  
c. Boarding Officer Visit Boarding Search Seizure (VBSS BO) 
The VBSS Boarding Officer School is taught by the same companies that 
teach SRF-A and NCB VBSS schools. This school is no different than the previous 
schools, they follow the requirements outlined in OPNAVINST 3591.1F. This is the 
official description for Visit, Board, Search, and Seizure Boarding Officer (VBSS BO) 
(A-2E-0085): 
This course prepares the VBSS Boarding Officer (BO), Assistant 
Boarding Officer (ABO), Security Team Leaders (STL), Liaison Officer 
and Intelligence Specialist (IS) to plan, execute, teach the biometrics 
collection equipment, and debrief VBSS procedures (Compliant and Non-
Compliant Low Freeboard) in support of Maritime Interdiction Operations 
(MIO). This course is designed for the BO/ABO/STL to attend prior to 
attending the NCB VBSS (A-830-0395) course. The course consists of 
both classroom and laboratory instruction, and includes: Safety, 
Documentation Review, Vessel Inspection (Cargo and Personnel), 
Identification and Management of Threats and Hazards, Evidence and 
Intelligence Information Collection and Documentation (Chain of 
Custody), Training Management, Collection of Biometrics, Management 
of Emergency Medical Incidents and Boarding Team Decontamination 
                                                 
6 Ibid. 
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Procedures, Mission Planning, and New Technology in support of 
Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO). Graduates also receive 
instruction on UN resolutions, pre-boarding procedures to include vessel 
queries and threat profiles, compliant and non-compliant boarding 
procedures, construction and submission of an After Action Report 
(AAR), and procedures for health and comfort inspections. This course 
requires a SECRET clearance.7 
The VBSS Boarding Officer School is usually reserved for Chief Petty 
Officers and above. In the description it specifies who needs to go and Commands choose 
to send their Boarding Officers, who are first and Second tour divisions officers and 
maybe a Chief and in some circumstances first class petty officers.  
d. Mechanical Breacher Visit Boarding Search Seizure (VBSS BR) 
The VBSS Mechanical Breacher School is taught by the same companies 
that teach SRF-A and NCB VBSS schools. This school is no different than the previous 
schools, they follow the requirements outlined in OPNAVINST 3591.1F. This is the 
official description for Visit, Board, Search, and Seizure Boarding Officer (VBSS BO) 
(A-830-0022): 
The Mechanical Breacher Technician course includes practical 
applications used currently by U.S. Navy SPECWAR and Non-Compliant 
Visit Board Search and Seizure Team Mechanical Breaches, as such, this 
course has an additional emphasis on Maritime Interdiction Operations, 
also providing practical training in breaching metal doors and walls, 
bulkheads and hatches, to wooden doors and entry ways. The Mechanical 
Breaching Technician course will provide training in the use of1) Manual 
Breaching Tools and Techniques, 2) Mechanical Breaching Tools and 
Techniques, 3) Ballistic (Shotgun) Breaching Tools and Techniques and 4) 
Exothermic (Torch) Breaching Tools and Techniques.8 
The Mechanical Breacher School is usually reserved for Engineering 
Department sailor that is mechanically inclined. In the description provided by RIPCO 
                                                 
7 Ibid. 
8 RIPCO, “Specialized Security and Investigation Services, Positive Solutions in an Asymmetrical 
Environment, Detailed description on Mechanical Breacher Technician course,” 2010. 
http://ripcointernational.com/id4.html. 
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the graduate will be able to breach many different types of surfaces which will increase 
the ability of the VBSS team. 
 




Figure 2.   VBSS Schools Description (From ATG Norfolk, 2012) 
e. Summary of the Current School and Qualification Requirements 
The Navy has invested millions training dollars on current sailors to make 
sure they possess the proper skills required to conduct non-compliant boardings, these 
sailors often hand-picked by the command due to rigorous qualifications and school 
requirements. This selection often drains the command of the early promote sailors from 
their divisions and puts them into a team that is often considered a collateral duty by 
many commands. This can often divide commands and create tension between divisions 
and the amount the VBSS team often lies with the discretion of the Commanding Officer 
and how they feel about the collateral mission of Maritime Interdiction Operations.  
2. Levels of Boardings 
The center's training covers both VBSS Level I, which focuses on ships that 
comply with the instructions of the inspection team, and Level II, which addresses the 
tactics used to board vessels that are non-compliant. Level II ships have freeboard (the 
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distance between the waterline and the main deck of the ship) of 25 feet or less above the 
water. Non-compliant vessels that have greater than 25 feet of freeboard, or that are 
actively opposing the boarding, are handled by teams of Special Operations Forces 
(SOF). 
 
Level Compliant Freeboard Insertion Principal Team 
I Yes N/A RHIB Ship 
II No <25 Feet RHIB Ship 
III No >25 Feet HELO MSRON  
IV Hostile N/A ANY SOF 
Figure 3.   VBSS Levels of Boardings (From Lockheed Martin, 2007) 
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III. SWOT ANALYSIS 
A. BACKGROUND OF SWOT ANALYSIS 
Appraising an organization’s resource strengths and weaknesses and its external 
opportunities and threats, commonly known as SWOT analysis, can provide a useful 
depiction of whether an organization’s overall situation is fundamentally healthy or 
unhealthy.  SWOT analysis was further developed by Stanford Research Institute in the 
1960’s to provide a basis for crafting strategies applicable to many Fortune 500 
companies.  The logic of the tool is straightforward, i.e., capitalize on existing resources 
(strengths), systematically consider the most appealing future opportunities, and defend 
against identified threats (Thompson, Crafting & Executing Strategy, 2007).  This study 
uses the SWOT tool as a framework for assessing a current versus a future alternative 
structure for the U.S. Navy VBSS program.  So, what are the relative strengths, 
weaknesses, opportunities and threats comparing an existing versus an alternative VBSS 
program?  The following short definitions apply: 
 Strengths are current characteristics of the organization/program that may 
give it an advantage over others, including resource strengths. 
 Weaknesses are current factors within an organization/program that may 
create disadvantages deterring or impeding it from accomplishing its mission 
and/or objectives, including the weakness of producing unintended 
consequences. Although a business example, it is well known that Kodak 
executives were convinced of the ongoing value of paper film in the 
photography industry.  In hindsight, this internal weakness translated into an 
inability to adapt in time to a digital world, resulting in their 2012 bankruptcy.  
 Opportunities are generally conceived of as external factors, forces and 
trends that should an organization capitalize on, success is likely to follow. Of 
course the intelligent reader knows that a weakness can often be framed as an 
opportunity.  
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 Threats are also external factors, forces and/or trends that should an 
organization fail to anticipate and/or respond to, dysfunction, bankruptcy 
and/or irrelevancy may predictably follow.  Kodak saw the digital movement 
as a threat to their (paper) photography business.  Even though they 
developed digital cameras early, they could not operationalize them. 
The following SWOT analysis provides an overview of the fit of the U.S. Navy 
VBSS program relative to an alternative detachment proposal for conducting Maritime 
Interdiction Operations.  The current VBSS program is considered first followed by the 
alternative VBSS detachments structure. 
Table 1 illustrates the process of SWOT analysis. 
 
Table 1.   SWOT Analysis Diagram(From 9) 
                                                 
9 Xhienne, SWOT analysis diagram, Sept. 30, 2007. 
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B. CURRENT BOARDING TEAMS 
1. Strengths 
a. Flexibility 
In a 2011 report from International Maritime Bureau the opportunity and 
occurrence of seaborne Piracy has flourished in the past decade. A previous report by 
OEF estimated the global cost of piracy for 2010 to be in the range of $7 to $12 billion10 
The U.S. Navy has responded to various allies and friendly shipping agencies to combat 
piracy by equipping every Navy ship with the capability to conduct Maritime security 
operations. This added personnel strength and policy focus to maritime security is 
probably crucial to mitigating piracy, terrorism, weapons proliferation, drug trafficking, 
and other illicit seaborne activities. Navy ships are required to be certified to conduct 
VBSS operations prior to going on deployment, e.g., certified personnel. This 
certification involves a detailed inspection of the ship’s boarding team, member’s 
qualifications and school graduate certificates, allowable equipment lists, required 
publications, and proficient demonstration of the mission with a team present to evaluate 
the boarding team’s performance. Once a ship’s boarding team is certified, they are able 
to conduct missions around the globe.  The catch is that many of these types of skills are 
perishable if not routinely practiced (a weakness), and time-to-practice underway is a 
scarce commodity.  
So the strength would definitely be consistency-of-training and the 
uniformity and assurance that certification can bring to the process.  Although the teams 
went through the same training pipeline and certification process, there is a clear 
difference between teams as they conduct missions around the world’s waters.  This can 
be attributed to the amount of time certain boarding teams receive from their chain of 
command (COC) to build this esprit de corps and unit cohesion.  
As of January 31, 2012, the composition of the surface fleet consists of the 
following: Amphibious Transport Docking (LPD) 12, Cruisers (CG) 22, Destroyers 
                                                 
10 Christopher Alessi, “Combating Maritime Piracy,” Council on Foreign Relations, March 23, 2012, 
http://www.cfr.org/france/combating-maritime-piracy/p18376. 
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(DDG) 59, Dock Landing Ship (LSD) 12, Frigates (FFG) 26, and Patrol Craft (PC) 10. 
All of these ships are required to maintain a VBSS team with 12 members except Patrol 
Crafts having a requirement for six members. This requirement for 12 Boarding Team 
Members (BTM) is a change from previous requirements of 18 BTM.  Therefore, 141 
Navy ships having the capability to conduct VBSS operations at sea sounds like strength.  
Having a global maritime presence may certainly have strengthened and contributed-to a 
series of successful anti-piracy operations in 2011/2012, some gaining notable media 
exposure.  
b. VBSS Team Diversity as a Strength 
Boarding teams are diverse in terms of their capabilities, i.e., as diverse as 
the multiple skill sets found on every Navy ship, e.g., from carpenters, electricians and 
radiomen, to ship-fitters, weapons handlers and communication specialists. This highly 
diverse composition of a typical boarding team is strength in that there is high variability 
in the VBSS environment, i.e. different scenarios require different skills. Many special 
operations members (SEALS) are provided a Navy rating, but because SEALS typically 
do not work and train in their particular rating, their skill-set may actually be more 
constrained (tailored) compared to a cross-section of comparable Navy sailors. Special 
forces military members are certainly skilled at what they do, say, forced take-down of 
armed pirates, yet ironically, a wider skill-set may be needed soon after hostile 
operations, e.g., troubleshooting a damaged radio or determining if a vessel is sea-
worthy. Therefore, VBSS shipboard team capabilities diversity can be framed as strength.  
As a certified, experienced boarding officer, I found that team selection 
and team training results in a strong and motivated team—initially. Not knowing what 
will happen when conducting VBSS operations, everyone relies on trust of their team 




a. Lack of Shipboard Training 
If shipboard VBSS team members attend virtually the same schools, then 
why is there a noticeable degradation in skills after the certification process? This 
question has been addressed in a prior thesis (Ray, 2010). Findings have attributed skill 
degradation to a lack of onboard practice and follow-on training, a lack of manpower, and 
insufficient chain of command support. For example, the boarding team function is 
labeled as a “collateral-duty,” which means that all other primary duties have priority, 
e.g., VBSS training gets “squeezed-out.” After Commanding Officers receive their 
certification to conduct Maritime Interdiction operations, their focus appears to shift to 
other matters, e.g., the next ship-wide inspection.  The problem is that the array of skills 
needed to perform well particularly in a potentially hostile boarding environment appears 
to degrade over time.  For example, boarding teams need to be in excellent physical 
condition for climbing, repelling and practicing close quarters battle (CBQ) movements, 
including routine communications training.  In short, boarding teams either have 
difficulty getting command approval to train in these areas during normal working hours 
and/or training gets superseded by other functions.  The training before or after working 
hours is just not particularly viable. Some boarding officers implement after hours 
physical training sessions to improve physical stamina and esprit de corps, which is 
probably helpful if it wasn’t sporadic. I would personally offer that spirit de corps is vital 
to team success and could translate into life or death consequences.   
b. Manpower 
There are a total of 141 Navy ships that retain the capability to conduct 
VBSS operations anywhere around the world.  Multiplying 141 by the number of 
boarding personnel required (12), results in approximately 1,692 sailors trained to 
conduct VBSS operations in the Navy’s fleet. A majority of these sailors are rated and 
fulfill mission critical Navy Enlisted Codes (NEC), requiring them to be onboard to focus 
on mission-critical equipment. There lies the predicament to that sailor’s chain of 
command, i.e., let sailor’s leave the ship for hours to practice this high risk mission, or 
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limit non-critical activities to focus on fulfilling enlisted contract obligations.  Boarding 
officers must routinely change team members, often due to unforeseen repairs usurping 
boarding personnel.  
So maintenance, critical repairs and filling watch bill requirements 
persistently pull boarding team members in different directions causing role conflict.  
Some ships remove VBSS team members from the watch bill when facing a MIO 
environment. This is often determined by the geographical location of the ship, 
particularly concerning the Persian Gulf or the Horn of Africa. When ships in-chop, 
and/or change operational commander’s, VBSS teams can be called-upon to respond to 
short notice missions. I experienced one-hour notifications on some boarding missions’ 
commands that leave VBSS teams on the watch bill therefore roll-the-dice on the 
probability of having a full-up boarding team ready to go.  Requirements overload, sleep 
deprivation and fatigue are not precursors for successful performance in high-risk 
environments.  In the following article taken from October 19, 2008 Navy Times article, 
Phillip Ewing outlines the issues with this optimal manning concept. 
There were also other forces calling for the Navy to reduce the manpower 
expense which makes up a majority of the Navy’s budget each year. In 
2002, Clark’s Navy Staff issued a change to the Navy Standard 
Workweek, the template planners use to assess how sailors use their time 
and, as such, how many sailors the Navy needs. Manpower requirements 
shall reflect the minimum quantity and quality of manpower required for 
peacetime and wartime to effectively and efficiently accomplish the 
activity’s mission,” said the message, signed by then-Chief of Naval 
Personnel Vice Adm. Norb Ryan. 
The Navy extended the time allotted for work from 67 hours a week to 70 
hours—which, when computed with the fleet’s manning formulas, meant 
the Navy could change its requirements to need fewer people, said retired 
Cmdr. Bill Hatch, a manning expert who teaches at the Naval 
Postgraduate School in Monterey, Calif.11 
The Navy approached optimal manning with these new templates or 
minimum requirements for peace and war time steaming. I Increasing the work week 
                                                 
11 Philip Ewing, “Lean Manning saps morale, puts sailors at risk,” October 19, 2008, Navy Times, 
http://www.navytimes.com/news/2009/10/navy_leanmanning_101909w/. 
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from 67 to 70 hours translates into fewer sailors onboard.  The Chief of Naval Operations 
(CNO) in front of the House Armed Service Committee stated, “Since 2000, our Navy’s 
ship-underway days have increased by approximately 15 percent, yet we have about 10 
percent fewer ships in our Fleet. Greater demand for our forces has led to longer 
deployments and shorter dwell, or turnaround times, which increase stress on our Sailors 
and drive up maintenance requirements for our ships and aircraft.”12 This illustrates the 
trend of mission expansion using fewer resources, including manpower and equipment. 
This trend has been identified as a major problem and has led the Navy to change 
positions on the optimal manning issue.  
Another factor affecting boarding teams is the number of personnel 
actually filling onboard billets.  Just because a ship is authorized to have a specified 
amount of people as directed by the Ship’s Manpower Document (SMD) does not 
necessarily mean those people are onboard and able to deploy with the ship.  NAVMAC 
recommends the amount of people needed to accomplish 100 percent of the mission, but 
the Navy typically does not authorize that full amount.  For example, a ship containing 
around 85 percent of its personnel is already over-extended by definition.  Multiply this 
shortcoming year after year and the unintended consequences can degrade maintenance, 







                                                 
12 Gary, Roughhead,  CNO, “STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL GARY ROUGHEAD CHIEF OF NAVAL 
OPERATIONS BEFORE THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE ON FY 2012 




Table 2.   DDG VBSS/MIO ROC 
3. Opportunities 
a. Plenty of Work, Expanding AORs 
A recent study revealed somewhat shockingly that during 2010, 4,185 
seafarers were attacked by pirates using firearms and/or rocket propelled grenades.  Over 
1,090 were taken hostage, and 516 were used as human shields. Approximately 488 
suffered psychological and/or physical abuse. 
Moreover, while innocent seafarers bear the brunt of these crimes, the 
world economy suffers too an annual cost that is now estimated to be between $7 billion 
and $12 billion U.S. dollars.  And, with more than 12 per cent of the total volume of oil 
transported by sea flowing through it, the Gulf of Aden becomes a strategic choke-point.  
Additionally, ships electing to divert via the Cape of Good Hope to avoid being attacked 
by pirates, face substantially longer voyages with accompanying higher fuel costs.  
The CNO’s recent testimony for the House Armed Forces Committee, 
discusses the Navy’s current posture concerning maritime security concerns. 
 
DDG 51 CLASS I III IV V 
MOS 4—PERFORM INTERDICTION.     
 MOS 4.4 Conduct Maritime Interception Operations (MIO) 
and or Visit, Board, Search and Seizure (VBSS) operations with 
naval/combined /joint forces. 
B.  
C. NOTE:  DDG capable of initial 
MIO/VBSS operations.  However, ship unable 
to maintain sustained operations or security 
team without support of MIO Detachment. 
D.  
E. I(L) - Requires standing down selected 
watch stations, unless MIO Detachment is 
embarked. 
F.  
 V(L) - Plan and train. 
L/E F/E F/E L 
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Global trends in economics, demographics, resources, and climate change 
portend an increased demand for maritime power and influence. 
America’s prosperity depends upon the seas: 90 percent of world trade 
moves on the world’s oceans and underwater telecommunications cables 
facilitate about $3.2 trillion of commerce each year. As new trade patterns 
emerge, such as those that will result from the expansion of the Panama 
Canal and the opening of the Arctic, and as disruption and disorder persist 
in our security environment, maritime activity will evolve and expand.13 
The Navy is a primary instrument and institution dedicated to maintaining 
U.S. economic, military, and political leadership and dominance in a fast-changing world.  
With the expansion of globalization and international trade markets, the sea lanes of 
commerce cannot be obstructed by modern piracy. This VBSS mission may be with us 
for quite a while.  
In the 2010 Navy Operation Concept stated, “As the 21st century unfolds, 
we must continue to be effective warriors as well as informed and articulate ambassadors, 
serving our Nation’s interests and facilitating free global interaction from the sea.”14 
The Navy has been confronting irregular challenges since the Age of Sail 
but in recent years the landscape of these challenges has changed. With the development 
of many technologies and arms that are able to be purchased off-the-shelve; this has led 
to more capable, equipped adversaries that have forced the hand of the U.S. Navy to 
expand their capabilities. Outline in the 2010 Navy Operations Concept they described 
these issues; 
Many of the threats in today’s dynamic security environment are irregular 
in nature, arising from state and non-state actors that operate from an 
increasing number of poor, corrupt, lawless, or weakly governed areas in 
the world. They achieve psychological, economic, and political effects 
through criminal, insurgent, and terrorist activities that are perpetrated 
with the help of extended support networks, resilient C2 structures, illegal 
funding sources, and off-the-shelf technologies and arms. Globalization 
                                                 
13 Gary Roughhead,  CNO, “STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL GARY ROUGHEAD CHIEF OF 
NAVAL OPERATIONS BEFORE THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE ON FY 2012 
DEPARTMENT OF NAVY POSTURE,” page 16, March 1, 2011, 
http://www.navy.mil/navydata/people/cno/Roughead/Testimony/CNO%20Roughead_Testimony_030111.p
df. 
14 U.S. Department of the Navy, “Naval Operations Concept 
2010.”http://www.navy.mil/maritime/noc/NOC2010.pdf. 
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and readily available advanced information technologies are accelerating 
the growth of such unlawful actors and their organizations, and 
intensifying the global impact they can create.13 
4. Threats 
a. Declining Defense Funding 
The January 3, 2012  report  “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership:  
Priorities for the 21st Century Defense”  highlights an assessment of the strategy in 
regards to a  “changing geopolitical environment and our changing fiscal 
circumstances”15  President Obama addresses the direction the Department of Defense 
(DoD) is heading to support a call for a reduction in spending while protecting U.S. 
National Security Interests.  This reduction in military spending will further stretch Naval 
forces depending on sustained funding to accomplish required missions.  Various sources 
have quoted the numbers, 1900 to 2057 man hours for own unit support (OUS) were 
omitted in the manning determination process.   These man hours numbers divided by the 
Navy Standard work week of 67 hours results in undermanned commands by 
approximately 30 plus sailors.  
b. Extending Deployments 
The Navy announced this March (2012) that six month deployments are a 
thing of the past and to expect no less than eight month deployments until notified. This 
change in length of deployments comes with the increased request for Navy support 
around the globe.  The Department of the Navy also announced the slowing of 
shipbuilding and the decommissioning of seven cruisers and two amphibious docking 
ships over the next five years.  In a March 12, 2012  Navy Times article, Rep. Randy 
Forbes, R- Va.,  Chairman of the House Armed Services readiness committee said, “We 
cannot be pushing our men and women this hard, this long. We cannot be pushing our 
vessels this long, this hard. We have no control of when these crises pop up, but we do 
                                                 




have some control of whether or not we are producing more ships."16  Summarizing Rep. 
Forbes, the Navy is pushing the Fleet too far and it will degrade the overall performance 
of ships and their crews.  Stretched-thin watchbills combined with the optimal manning 
policy, combined with eight-month deployments may translate into an over-worked fleet.  
C. ALTERNATIVE BOARDING TEAMS 
1. USMC Boarding Teams 
a. Summary of USMC Boarding Teams 
The United States Marine Corps will of course adapt to anticipated 
personnel cuts over the short and mid-term.  In an August 2011 Commandant Gen. Jim 
Amos stated “Marines form the service's 202,000 active-duty end strength, but political 
and fiscal realities may require the Corps to cut deeper. There is pressure to go below the 
186,800.” 17 The Marine Corps has been conducting maritime raids since the age of sail 
and could play a major role in the future of maritime security operations as they finish up 
a decade of wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. The Navy’s amphibious ships have been 
deploying with Marines onboard that have skill sets required for the Visit, Board, Search, 
and Seizure (VBSS) mission. In February 2006 MARSOC was welcomed into SOCOM. 
This new assignment to USSSOCOM added missions to the MEU (SOC)  repertoire. 
One of the missions they found themselves training for was the VBSS level IV boarding 
capabilities. Marines have recently conducted a joint boarding with members of the USS 
Dubuque LPD-8 boarding team in 2010.  
b. Motor Vessel Magellan Star Takedown Summary: 
On September 9, 2010 a German flagged cargo ship, the MV Magellan 
Star was seized approximately 85 miles of the coast of Yemen by nine Somalia pirates. 
Marine commandos—assigned to the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit's Maritime Raid 
                                                 
16 Sam Fellman, “Pushing the Fleet too far? Routine 8-month deployments part of Navy’s plan to meet 
global demand” Navy Times, March 12, 2012, pg. 18. 




Force and serving in the region as part of an international anti-piracy task force—
prepared to intervene. By early Thursday, the pirates found themselves surrounded by 
two U.S. warships, the Dubuque and the Princeton, as well as a Turkish frigate on patrol 
for the anti-piracy task force. Navy helicopters also hovered around the hijacked 
container ship, but the pirates - defiantly waving AK-47s—refused to surrender, Marine 
and Navy officials said.  About 5 a.m., the platoon of Marine commandos climbed on 
board the Magellan Star from boarding craft that had pulled alongside the ship. They 
subdued the pirates within minutes. 18 
Take note in this incident there is no mention of any Navy or Coast 
Guard teams being involved in this opposed boarding even though they participated. This 
takedown was a joint operation conducted with two elements.  Alpha Element took the 
lead in the apprehension of the pirates, while Bravo Element was in charge of the rescue 
of the ship’s crew below decks. Once the ship was secured, Bravo Element alerted the 
Coast Guard team and Dubuque’s boarding team to come aboard MV Magellan Star to 
assist in intelligence collection and prisoner affairs19. This opposed boarding illustrates 
the capability and skill-set of the Marines that are a valuable yet possibly under-utilized 
tool in this area.  Marines conducting VBSS operations could improve overall Naval 
capability in combating irregular warfare at sea. 
2. Strengths of USMC Boarding Teams 
a. Training 
From day one in boot camp the Marines are held to higher, more stringent 
standards compared to other services.   Marine recruits attend boot camp for 12 weeks 
followed by infantry or combat training. Navy recruits attend boot camp for eight weeks 
which does not have any follow on combat training except for certain ratings, SEALS, 
EOD, and Seabees. The physical standards and weapons qualifications are also 
significantly greater for Marine recruits than their Navy counterparts. This adoption of 
                                                 
18 Craig Whitlock, “Marines seize ship from pirates” The Washington Post, September 10, 2010, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/09/09/AR2010090907539.htm.l. 
19 Alexander Martin CAPT, comment on “The Magellan Star: Pirate Takedown, Force Recon Style” 
USNI US Navy Institute, September 2010, http://blog.usni.org/2010/09/10/the-magellan-star/. 
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Marine Corps culture creates better warfighters probably needed for optimum VBSS 
accomplishment.  The Navy is at a disadvantage from day one in trying to develop sailors 
as part-time para-combat forces.  The training to kill an enemy is not a top priority in 
Navy boot camp but is the primary end-state for the recruits at Marine Corps boot camp.  
Upon completion of basic training Marines are sent to the United States 
Marine Corps School of Infantry (SOI). At the SOI Marines are divided up into infantry 
Military Occupation Specialty (MOS) and non-combatant MOS. The infantry MOS 
marines attend Infantry Training Battalion (ITB) for 59 days. The IBT mission is, “train 
and qualify Marines in entry level infantry military occupational specialties [in order to] 
provide the operating forces and reserve component with Marines capable of conducting 
expeditionary combat operations.”20 All combatant MOS Marines have the same first two 
week training which includes: combat marksmanship, identifying and countering 
improvised explosive devices, convoy operations, Military Operations in Urban Terrain 
(MOUT), tactical formations, land navigation, and patrolling.  After completing this two 
week introduction Marines are sent to MOS specific training.  The general mission 
statement form the USMC website states ITB as: 
During the training cycle you will receive instruction in Combat 
Marksmanship, Grenades, Improvised Explosive Devices, Convoy 
Operations, Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT), Combat 
Formations, Land Navigation, Patrolling, as well as instruction specific to 
your Military Occupational Specialty (MOS). You will also undergo 
physical conditioning via Physical Training (PT), conditioning hikes, and 
sustainment training in the Marine Corps Martial Arts. Most importantly, 
you will become a complete Marine, by applying the Leadership Traits, 
and our Core Values in every aspect of your life.21 
The non-infantry MOS marines attend Marine Combat Training (MCT) 
for 29 days, which teaches them basic combat skills. Though not as robust as ITB the 
non-infantry MOS marines get a substantial amount of training them to be a warfighter. 
The general mission statement form the USMC website states MCT as: 
                                                 
20 Kimberly Johnson, (September 30, 2007). "SOI adds 7 days, weapons skill to training" Marine 
Corps Times. http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/2007/09/marine_soi_070929/. 
21 USMC website, “ITB Training Information,” March 2012, 
http://www.marines.mil/unit/tecom/soiwest/Pages/ITBn/ITBTrainingInformation.aspx. 
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Marine Combat Training Battalion consists of a 29-day course in which 
entry-level Marines are taught the common skills needed in combat. While 
at Marine Combat Training Battalion every Marine will learn the basics of 
combat marksmanship, grenades, M203 Grenade Launcher, AT-4 Rocket 
Launcher, M240B Medium Machine Gun, Improvised Explosive Devices, 
defensive fundamentals, convoy operations, offensive fundamentals, 
patrolling, Military Operations on Urban Terrain (MOUT), tactical 
communications, Combat Hunter, M249 Squad Automatic Weapon, and 
land navigation. They will also undergo combat conditioning through the 
use of obstacle courses, conditioning hikes, combat fitness runs, and the 
Marine Corps Martial Arts Program (MCMAP). Upon completion of 
Marine Combat Training every Marine will have the knowledge and 
ability to successfully operate in a combat environment as a basic 
rifleman.22 
This training pipeline is extensive for both infantry and non-infantry MOS 
marines and reaffirms the slogan “"Every Marine is, first and foremost, a Rifleman.” This 
training that the Marines undergo is a huge asset that is available for the current VBSS 
and MIO mission.  
b. Experience 
The USMC is finishing up a decade of combat operations with the average 
marine deploying at least two five month deployments to Iraq or Afghanistan in a four 
year enlistment. The amount of experience gained from these combat action veterans 
could be utilized in other areas if the  USMC is provided the opportunity.   The USMC 
could create smaller teams that would specialize and focus their war-fighting skills 
towards a maritime environment. The leaner more versatile detachments could embark on 
the Carrier Strike Groups (CSG) and Expeditionary Strike Groups (ESG) and conduct 
level IV boardings in a 24-hour notice anywhere around the world.   
The previous summary section discussed the takedown of the high jacked 
M/V Magellan Star by the Force Recon Marines of the 15th MEU.  Captain Martin 
stated, “These Marines went through a very diverse training pipeline prior to embarking 
with the 15th MEU. During their four phase work-up prior to being certified by SOC they 
                                                 
22 USMC website, “MCT General Information,” March 2012 
http://www.marines.mil/unit/tecom/soiwest/Pages/MCTBn/MCT%20General%20Information.aspx. 
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conducted multiple VBSS missions as the assault element of the MEU’s Maritime Raid 
Force.”23  Captain Martin outlines the Training Pipeline for this VBSS Training as listed. 
 Rigorous eight week weapons and tactics training 
 Classes on MIO and Counter-Piracy Ops 
 Familiarization of Nautical and ship terms 
 Ship design and classification 
 Helo insertion tactics 
 RHIB insertion tactics 
These classes include the same information that is covered in the Navy’s 
VBSS curriculum with the exception of Helo insertion tactics. The MEU Maritime Raid 
Force is certified to conduct Level IV Opposed Boardings, so why is the Navy still 
sending amphibious fleet sailor to VBSS School and allowing them to conduct boardings 
when a better trained and more experienced team is onboard.  
c. Already “On-board” Amphib Fleet 
Marines have deployed underway on Navy ships from the age of sail and 
this is true in today’s military.  The Navy currently deploys 29 amphibious warfare ships 
to carry Marines and equipment into combat and to perform peacetime missions.24 All 
29 of these ships transport Marines to the fight, and all of the MEUSOC members are 
certified to the level IV VBSS boarding. The Commanders have seen the value in the 
Amphibious Fleet and have requested them more than any other ship to project power 
since 2007.   The 2010 Navy Operating Concept stated, “The combatant commanders’ 
demand for forward postured naval forces, particularly carrier strike groups (CSGs), 
amphibious ready groups with embarked Marine expeditionary units (ARG/MEUs), and 
surface action groups, exceeds the current and forecast capacity of the Naval Service. 
Since 2007 the combatant commanders’ cumulative requests for naval forces have grown 
                                                 
23 Alexander Martin, CAPT, “Evolution of a Ship Takedown” Proceedings Magazine, November 
2010, Vol. 136/11/1,293, http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2010-11. 
24 Charles S. Clark, “Navy’s amphibious fleet could fall short of goals, CBO says,” Government 
Executive, November 2011, http://www.govexec.com/defense/2011/11/navys-amphibious-fleet-could-fall-
short-of-goals-cbo-says/35497/. 
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29 percent for CSGs, 76 percent for surface combatants, 86 percent for ARG/MEUs, and 
53 percent for individually deployed amphibious ships.”25Combatant Commanders have 
certainly seen the value in the Marines when it comes to efficient use of precise force in 
all domains. 
The infrastructure and the skill sets are in place and the Navy would not 
have to build new berthing or add this asset because it has already been conducting this 
mission for years.  This joint service effort would give the Marines a mission while on 
cruise and would allow Sailors to stand their watches, conduct maintenance on their 
equipment, and improve rating skills—all beneficial for the ship. 
3. Weaknesses of USMC Boarding Teams 
a. Different Mission 
The Maritime Raid mission is a relatively newer mission for the 
MEUSOC and was only recently introduced into their qualification process. To get all of 
the Marines attached to the amphibious assault ships would likely require a substantial 
amount of resources in time and money.   However the MEUSOC would be capable to 
conduct the VBSS mission for the ships that they are attached and increase that capability 
by conducting level IV opposed boardings.  The ship’s crew could assist the Marines in 
the administration details that accompany the VBSS mission in the after action reports 
and Intel collection areas.  
4. Opportunities for USMC Boarding Teams 
a. Expanding AOR 
As previous discussed in the Expanding AOR section of the current 
boarding teams, the AOR is still vast and shows no signs of decreasing.   In an October 
2011 statement by the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) controlled 
International Maritime Bureau (IBM), “Piracy on the world’s seas has risen to record 
                                                 
25 Data provided by U.S. Fleet Forces Command as of 23 September 2009 and is based on a 
comparison of force requests for fiscal years 2007 through 
2010.http://www.navy.mil/maritime/noc/NOC2010.pdf. 
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levels, with Somali pirates behind 56% of the 352 attacks reported this year.”26 Later on, 
Pottengal Mukundan, Director of IMB, whose Piracy Reporting Centre (PRC) has 
monitored piracy worldwide since 1991 stated, “Somali pirates are intensifying 
operations not just off their own coastline, but further afield in the Red Sea—particularly 
during the monsoon season in the wider Indian Ocean.”24 The Somali pirates seem to be 
expanded the area of operation and there is intelligence that suggests that the Somalis are 
looking into broadening their capabilities and these capabilities will be discussed in the 
threats section.  In 2010, piracy off the Horn of Africa cost the international economy an 
estimated seven to twelve billion, and between 2007 and 2010 Somali attacked more than 
450 ships and had taken more than 2,400 hostages. 27 Though these attacks off the Horn 
of Africa make up the majority of piracy, there has been a new area off the coast of 
Africa. Pottengal Mukundan outlined the areas of Benin, of the western coast of Africa. 
“Benin is seeing a surge in violent piracy, with 19 attacks leading to eight tanker 
hijackings this year, up from zero incidents in 2010. A pattern has emerged where armed 
pirates board and hijack the ship sometimes injuring crew then force the Masters to sail to 
an unknown location where they steal the ship’s properties and cargo, and let the vessel 
free.”24 This new area could spur more poverty stricken areas to take up this new way of 
extorting money.  Pottengal Mukundan stated: 
The response from Nigeria and Benin Navies is a step in the positive 
direction but the problem will occur in the prosecution of these pirates 
under international law. Attacks have also been reported off the coasts of 
Bangladesh, Nigeria, Haiti, Colombia, Peru, and Brazil among other 
places around the world.28 
                                                 
26 Pottengal Mukundan, “As world piracy hits a new high, more ships are escaping Somali pirates, 
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5. Threats for USMC Boarding Teams 
a. New Piracy Tactics 
Piracy has existed since the age of sail and really has not been an 
important issue until the past couple of years; as pirates appear more daring and 
resourced. Long gone are the days of untrained pirates on four to five meter skiffs 
approaching a ship and boarding with no plan or support structure in place.  The 
following paragraphs outline the newly developed tactics of the Somali pirates; and 
discuss why these tactics are working.  
Somali pirates often go to sea in a “mother ship, “which is usually a 
fishing vessel captured in a previous pirate attack. The mother ship 
enables the pirates to stay at sea longer and operate further away from 
Somalia than if they just used their skiffs. Earlier in this decade, they often 
used skiffs to launch attacks from land. The pirates also use the mother 
ship to scout for targets of opportunity. Once a passing cargo ship has 
been spotted, the mother ship deploys two to four smaller high-speed 
vessels (skiffs), which flank the target and approach at high speed. To 
slow or stop the ship, pirates use various means of intimidation, including 
firing automatic weapons and rocket-propelled grenades. 
Once the target has slowed, a team of seven to 10 pirates boards the ship 
using ladders and grappling hooks and takes the ship and its crew hostage. 
The team of pirates is usually armed, and the small number of crewmen 
required to operate modern merchant ships (usually no more than a dozen) 
makes hijacking a ship relatively easy. Once hijacked, larger cargo ships 
and their crews are often sailed to a pirate port in Somalia to await 
negotiation and payment of their ransom. Pirates also maintain networks 
of depots along coasts, where they can sell captured goods, rearm, and 
resupply their ships. The network of depots also affords them the 
opportunity to communicate with spies in the region to obtain information 
about ships that may be passing through the area. Profits from hijacked 
cargo are disbursed to the pirate suppliers, organizers, and investors who 
support the pirates during their time at sea. The illegal income may also 
benefit their clan members, including family and friends. The profits from 
piracy support the local economy, filtering through the community as 
pirates resupply and upgrade their vessels and weapons and as those in the 
network spend their wages.29 
                                                 
29 James J. Carafano, “Taking the Fight to the Pirates: Applying Counterterrorist Methods to the 
Threat of Piracy” Backgrounder, March 2011, No.2524, 
http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2011/pdf/bg2524.pdf. 
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These new tactics illustrate the ability of the Somali pirates to adapt to the 
newly implemented tactics by their enemies.  Somalis now understand the importance of 
intelligence gathering and sea basing to further expand their reach for targeted vessels.  
The new tactics signals that piracy is not going away, and as they change to combat our 
efforts, the coalition forces will also have to change to counter their efforts.  
b. Defense Downsizing 
In today’s shrinking fiscal environment, the Department of Defense (DoD) 
is cutting costs, and the Marine Corps and Army are downsizing personnel.  Even though 
the infrastructure and assets are in place for embarked Marines to conduct VBSS 
missions, increased training costs would probably need to come from SOCCOM funding.  
6. USCG Boarding Teams 
a. Summary of USCG Boarding Teams 
The United States Coast Guard (USCG) created the Law Enforcement 
Detachments (LEDETs) in 1982 to assist Navy ships in the counter narcotic mission. 
Following 1982 the USCG saw the value in these LEDETs, in conjunction with an 
expanding mission area choose to increase the number of teams. “In the 1990s, the 
individual LEDETs were consolidated under three Tactical Law Enforcement Teams 
(TACELTs): Tactical Law Enforcement Team North (TACLET North) based in 
Chesapeake, Virginia, Tactical Law Enforcement Team South (TACLET South), based 
in Opa-locka, Florida, and the Pacific Area Tactical Law Enforcement Team 
(PACTACLET) based in San Diego, California.”30 The following is the synopsis of the 
2010 disposition of the USCG’s Tactical Law Enforcement Teams detailed in a report on 
The U.S. Coast Guard’s Deployable Specialized Forces to  Governmental Accounting 
Office (GAO): 
 Tactical Law Enforcement Teams (two teams) 
1. Pacific Tactical Law Enforcement (Eight Law Enforcement) 
 San Diego, California 
                                                 
30 Michael Shelton, “The Forward Edge of Drug Interdiction,” The Navy League of the United States, 
http://www.navyleague.org/seapower_mag/sept2001/forward_edge_of_drug.htm. 
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2. Tactical Law Enforcement Team South (Nine Law Enforcement) 
 Miami, Florida 
 Tactical Law Enforcement Number of Personnel 
 204 
b. Unit Description 
Tactical Law Enforcement Teams provide specialized law enforcement 
and maritime security capabilities to enforce U.S. laws across a spectrum of maritime 
missions, including drug interdiction and vessel interception operations. The Coast 
Guard’s two Tactical Law Enforcement Teams collectively are composed of 17 smaller 
units (Law Enforcement Detachments) whose average complement consists of 9 
personnel with a range of capabilities—e.g., precision marksmen and law enforcement 
boarding officers perform around 40 deployments per year, with each detachment 
averaging over 185 days away from its home base. Teams typically conduct their primary 
mission (law enforcement) in the Caribbean Sea and Eastern Pacific Ocean. Teams have 
also provided training to foreign naval, coast guard and police forces in the Caribbean, 
Pacific Ocean, Asia, Africa, Central and South America, and the Middle East. More 
recently, Law Enforcement Detachments have been deployed to the Gulf of Aden and the 
eastern coast of Somalia as part of a multinational task force to suppress piracy.31 The 
Coast Guard’s mission has begun exponentially growing following September 11th. 
Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO) has been expanded from brown to blue water 
operations for the Coast Guard and do not seem to be going away anytime soon. The 
Coast Guard LEDETs have been working jointly with all services since the first Gulf War 
in various maritime operations. Their training in Law enforcement assists them in a 
manner that would allow the Navy to prosecute piracy and trafficking inside the 
Exclusion Economic Zone (EEZ) of the United States.  
                                                 
31 United States Coast Guard, “Coast Guard: Deployable Operations Group Achieving Organizational 
Benefits, but Challenges Remain” Enclosure II, April 2010, http://www.gao.gov/assets/100/96651.pdf. 
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7. Strengths of USCG Boarding Teams 
a. Training 
The Coast Guard LEDETs go through an extensive training pipeline that 
allows them to conduct boardings in both inland and international waters. The primary 
school for a Coast Guard member to get into (TACLET), Law Enforcement Detachments 
(LEDET), and Maritime Safety and Security Teams (MSST), is the Basic Tactical 
Operations Course (BTOC). The stated purpose of the BTOC is, “This seven week course 
delivers maritime interdiction common tactical skills and advanced tactical 
marksmanship to prepare personnel for high risk response mission operations.”32 Another 
description provided by MARSEC4, “The Basic Tactical Operations Course primarily 
teaches students the fundamentals of marksmanship. In seven weeks, students fire 
thousands of rounds at flat ranges, houses, around barricades and at close range.”33 The 
BTOC is similar to the pipeline that Navy VBSS teams attend, SRF-B, SRF-A, and NEC 
course.  
In 2004, the USCG established the Maritime Law Enforcement (MLE) 
Academy at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center in Charleston, South Carolina.  
The primary mission of MLE was to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
USCG personnel conducting maritime law enforcement.  The MLE Academy offers nine 
training programs to create a better more educated and proficient Maritime Law 
Enforcement personnel.  The list that is outlined on their website includes, Boarding 
Officer Course, Boarding Officer Practical, BO eLearning, Ports waterways coastal 
security, Boarding Team Member, Radiation Detection Level II Operators, Marine Patrol 
Officer Instructor, Marine Patrol Officer Tactical, International Boarding Officer Course, 
Maritime Law Enforcement Boarding Officer Counter Drug Operation Course.”34 These 
                                                 
32 USCG website, “Special Missions Training Center Basic Tactical Operations Course,” 
http://www.uscg.mil/smtc/Training_USCG_BTOC.asp. 
33 Thomas, J. Griffith, SGT USMC, “USCG Basic Tactical Operator Course” MARSEC4 Team, July 
2011, http://www.marsec4.com/2011/07/uscg-basic-tactical-operator-course/. 
 34 USCG website, “Maritime Law Enforcement Academy” USCG website, 
http://www.uscg.mil/mlea/courses/boc.asp. 
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courses range from 24 hours of training for Radiation to five weeks for the Boarding 
Officer course.  In contrast the Navy’s Boarding Officer course is only one week long.  
In summary, the U.S. Coast Guard has developed an effective training 
program, that is exhaustive and highly specialized, that would allow them to conduct 
MIO and/or VBSS in any maritime area around the globe. These courses are more 
detailed and teach more information than the Navy VBSS Team Trainer course that all 
boarding team members are required to complete.  Furthermore, the U.S. Navy Boarding 
Officer course is only one week, compared to the five-week Coast Guard Boarding 
Officer course.   
b. Knowledge Regarding Maritime Law 
Maritime Law is emphasized for all levels of U.S. Coast Guard LEDET 
members. This understanding of International, Federal, and State laws would greatly 
improve the capabilities of the U.S. Navy and expand their areas of operation. In a 
statement from the U.S. Coast Guard regarding Office of Law Enforcement CG-531, 
The United States Coast Guard is the nation's leading maritime law 
enforcement agency and has broad, multi-faceted jurisdictional authority. 
The specific statutory authority for the Coast Guard Law Enforcement 
mission is given in 14 USC 2, "The Coast Guard shall enforce or assist in 
the enforcement of all applicable laws on, under and over the high seas 
and waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States." In addition, 14 
USC 89 provides the authority for U.S. Coast Guard active duty 
commissioned, warrant and petty officers to enforce applicable U.S. law. 
It authorizes Coast Guard personnel to enforce federal law on waters 
subject to U.S. jurisdiction and in international waters, as well as on all 
vessels subject to U.S. jurisdiction (including U.S., foreign and stateless 
vessels). 35 
The U.S. Coast Guard has greater jurisdiction in the capacity of 
conducting boardings and this would expand the overall ability and improve the skill set 
for the U.S. Navy’s MIO/VBBS mission. 
                                                 
35 USCG website, “Office of Law Enforcement CG-531” USCG website, 
http://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/cg531/. 
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8. Weaknesses of USCG Boarding Teams 
a. Costs 
The current disposition of the U.S. Coast Guard is significantly smaller 
than the U.S. Navy.  To grow the forces required to put 12 man teams on every ship in 
the Navy would be an enormous cost and in a fiscal constrained environment, the 
probabilities of growth are unlikely.  The U.S. Coast Guard does fall under both the DoD 
and Department for Homeland Security so there might be funds available through one of 
these routes. 
9. Opportunities for USCG Boarding Teams 
a. Expanding AOR 
The expanding AOR has been discussed at length in the previous 
opportunities sections, but for the U.S. Coast Guard being under the control of both DoD 
and Department of Homeland Security is already having difficulties meeting all missions.  
The U.S. Coast Guard has partnered with the U.S. Navy more frequently in recent years 
in the fight against Narcotics smuggling and in the War on Terror in the Gulf.  The 
LEDET were the main contributors in the training of Iraqi Naval Forces during the 
stability operations of the recent Gulf War.  
In the article outlining the U.S. Coast Guard’s mission during Operation 
Iraqi Freedom, Dr. Thiesen stated, “The navy saw the Coast Guard’s cutters and skilled 
personnel as ideally suited to naval operations supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom. In 
addition, the law enforcement background of Coast Guard personnel would expand the 
navy’s ability to intercept and board Iraqi vessels and Coast Guard cutters could serve in 
force protection and escort duty, thereby freeing naval assets to conduct offensive combat 
operations.”36  The U.S. Navy recognizes the capabilities possessed by the U.S. Coast 
Guard and requests their assistance in many areas they might be lacking in.  This overlap 
of critical capabilities is the overall idea for two separate services; the Navy controls the 
                                                 
36 William H. Thiesen, PhD, “Guardians of the Gulf: A History of Coast Guard Combat Operations in 
Support of Operation Iraqi Freedom, 2002-2004” June 2009, 
http://www.uscg.mil/history/articles/USCGinOIF.pdf. 
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“Blue” water while the Coast Guard controls the “Brown” water.  With the continuous 
push for more standardization of capabilities and joint operations the DoD will look for 
savings in this area.  
10. Threats for USCG Boarding Teams 
a. Defense Downsizing 
The U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), part of DoD and part of the Department of 
Homeland Security, is also feeling the cuts.  Defense expert Robin Laird stated, “While 
the Administration is reducing the numbers of USCG cutters in the Pacific and arguing 
against the full number of replacement cutters and the building of a new Offshore Patrol 
Cutter, the need for an expanded USCG capability is going up,” 37.  James Carafano 
added, “This is yet another disconnect between words and deeds.”35 Many experts 
thought the USCG would be less affected when it came to downsizing, but it is clear that 
they will be affected the same as the other services.  The story is the same with the USCG 
as it is with the other services; the administration continues to increase our 
responsibilities without the funding. This leads to an overworked and exhausted military 
force that is not prepared for high risk missions.  
D. DEDICATED USN BOARDING TEAMS (SIMILAR NECC PROGRAM) 
1. Summary of NECC Boarding Teams 
The Navy discovered the gap in the level III VBSS/ MIO capability and decided 
to created seven 23-man Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC) Maritime 
Security Squadron (MSRON) VBSS detachments.  These detachments would fall under 
the Navy Expeditionary Combat Command and would station four teams in Little Creek, 
Virginia and the other three out of North Island, California.  These newly created teams 
were are not created to replace or augment surface ship VBSS capability.  The first two 
detachments completed training with the first deployment scheduled for October 2007.  
In a 2009 Navy Times article by Andrew Scruto, Lt. Cmdr. Susan Henson, spokeswoman 
                                                 
37 James Carafano, “Pentagon Not Only Place Hollowing Out,” The Foundry, May 2011, 
http://blog.heritage.org/2011/05/09/u-s-coast-guard-faces-troubling-cuts/. 
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for the Navy Expeditionary Combat Command, said, “Two teams have deployed, with 
the Abraham Lincoln and Ronald Reagan carrier strike groups, but were not sure if they 
completed any boardings.”38 Although many of these teams did not deploy, these teams 
met a Level III capability outlined by the Chief of Naval Operations Guidance in 2006. In 
2007 Maritime Expeditionary Security Force (MESF) accepted the VBSS level III 
personnel as part of its concept of operations. 
2. Strengths 
a. Dedicated Force 
One of the main issues that current boarding teams face is double-tasking, 
i.e., train thoroughly in your rating and train thoroughly in VBSS.  If/when sailors must 
choose one over the other, a gap is created forcing their shipmates to take up the slack.  . 
With a dedicated detachment of VBSS personnel attached to ship’s company, sailors 
could perform their duties outlined in the billet code and the ROC/POE.   Dedicated 
detachments would free-up ship’s company to perform their primary missions.  These are 
the main issues facing boarding team members, ship CO’s, and indeed every sailor on 
board. 
b. Better Trained 
The members of this NECC controlled VBSS teams attending many of the 
same schools as the ship’s boarding teams attend, but added a few more to get them 
qualified to conduct the Level III boarding mission.  Members of this NECC VBSS 
boarding teams received training for helicopter insertion also known as HVBSS.  This 
HVBSS capability significantly increases the mission set and capability being able to 
conduct boardings with a higher freeboard and get onboard quicker than climbing.  
Members get the opportunity to continually train and develop that muscle memory that 
many combat forces also discuss when they have to react to hostilities in theatre.  This 
repetition of knowledge, skills and abilities (KSA) allow the members of the VBSS teams 
                                                 
38 Andrew Scutro, “Future of boarding teams in doubt,” Navy Times, January 11, 2009, 
http://www.navytimes.com/news/2009/01/navy_boardingteams_011009/. 
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to retain more of these KSA’s thus better preparing them if the mission goes towards 
non-compliant or even opposed.  
3. Weaknesses 
a. Costs 
The reason NECC removed the VBSS dedicated teams from their 
commands were costs.  However they did not remove the teams completely, they 
integrated them and their capabilities into the Maritime Expeditionary Security Force. As 
the DoD attempts to reduce the budget by 1.5 trillion over the next five years, they are 
not going to be too interested in establishing any type of new detachment that is going to 
cost money.  The work around might be to maintain that capability, but put it under the 
control of another unit so the support structure is already in place, therefore minimizing 
overhead costs.  
4. Opportunities 
a. Expanding AORs 
These are the same as the previous sections involving the VBSS/MIO 
mission areas. There should be no deviation from the other sections outlining this 
opportunities area.  
5. Threats 
a. Defense Downsizing 
These are the same as the previous sections involving the DoD downsizing 
and the pursuit to save the Federal government to meet the fiscal policies adopted by the 
current administration.  There should be no difference from the other sections outlining 
threats in this area.  
E. SUMMARY OF SWOT ANALYSIS 
U.S. Navy VBSS teams have performed well on numerous maritime security 
missions without any known serious injury or loss of life.  VBSS teams on onboard all 
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U.S. Navy surface ships can conduct boardings up to level II anywhere at sea.  This 
flexibility allows the U.S. Navy to project this capability around the globe.  One distinct 
disadvantage that the current VBSS teams have is the amount of time they are authorized 
onboard the ship to practice and rehearse this skill set.  Sailors do not attend the same 
types of schools that a Marine might attend, therefore they are at a disadvantage when it 
comes to a fight or flight situation.  This is not a fault of the Sailor; it is the culture of the 
Navy not to create warfighters similar to the USMC or the Army.  The Marines possess a 
competitive advantage in the area of offensive operations and are likely a preferred 
option to shipboard VBSS teams. This could be accomplished with a minor expense due 
to the infrastructure already in place and they already have the required training for this 
mission.  All the Services are feeling the effects of ongoing and anticipated reductions in 
military spending.  Maritime security is a vital piece of national and inter-national 
security, and the Navy has been tasked to keep this environment safe for all mariners.  
Either protect and augment the funding for continued VBSS development and 
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IV. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. SUMMARY 
1. Change VBSS Structure or Prioritize Deployment Training 
As the Navy’s experiment with Optimal Manning comes to a close, this study 
examined an increasingly important U.S. Navy mission of training, certifying and 
deploying on-board Officer and Enlisted Visit, Board, Search and Seizure (VBSS) teams.  
Although VBSS teams have been accomplishing the mission since the late 1990s, adding 
these duties onto shipboard sailors without increasing personnel numbers has resulted in 
unattractive tradeoffs for sailors and their supervisors, and is not reflective of the 
important manpower-driving document, the required operational capabilities and 
projected operational environment (ROC/POE).  
The unattractive tradeoff occurs when a sailor must be proficient and qualified in 
two, major competing areas—especially during deployment, i.e., prioritize training 
around one’s Navy Enlisted Code (NEC) and rating; and/or prioritize training around 
VBSS team development?  Answering yes to both sounds heroic and can-do, but can 
easily degenerate into nonproductive conflict, i.e., being in two places at once.  There 
may be a lack of understanding in that VBSS certification identifies only a basic skill 
level, which must then be systematically developed and practiced during deployment. 
In short, effective teams have to be built and maintained, similar yet different 
from developing individual technical skills, e.g., fire-fighting teams, Special Forces 
teams.  Team cohesiveness cannot really be learned in a schoolhouse, rather effective 
team members must learn and want to work together.  Commanding Officers also have a 
direct bearing on enhancing and/or impeding training by the various teams underway.  
If this maritime support area remains important for international sea lane security 
and protection of life, limb and property, then the following recommendations are 
offered:  (1) Change the current VBSS shipboard team structure and replace it with 
dedicated Fifth Fleet VBSS detachments, or (2) Elevate the training priority of shipboard 
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VBSS teams during deployment. Finally, correct the ROC/POE so that it reflects VBSS 
manpower requirements and man accordingly. 
2. Post Qualification Required Training 
A disparity exists among ship’s boarding teams attending the same training 
pipeline and certification process. The disparity in the quality of the teams can be partly 
attributed to the amount of training time obtained by shipboard teams to practice the 
VBSS/MIO mission during deployment. In my experience, if the Commanding Officer 
believes in the VBSS/MIO mission, s/he will authorize and support team training. 
Unfortunately, a lack of interest can translate into a training impediment, i.e., CO’s 
projects and sailors’ primary (traditional) duties crowd-out VBSS training. The point is 
that certified teams are at a base level, which unless enhanced by systematic and realistic 
training is simply insufficient.  Developing and maintaining VBSS team cohesion can 
only occur after formal training.  Kevin Ray stated in his 2010 thesis, “The current VBSS 
team trainer course also was discussed in depth. All of the participants agreed that the 
course does an outstanding job in preparing the sailors for noncompliant boardings, but it 
fails in many other areas.”39  Other areas include level I/II and approach and assist 
(AAV) operations.  Schoolhouse skills although crucial are perishable without dedicated 
refresher training. 
3. Lockheed Martin Study 
a. Summary 
A Lockheed Martin study determined that there was an inaccuracy 
between the OPNAV ROC/POE capability portrayed in Table 3 and the other directives.  
The ROC specifies a temporarily manned team (E), limited capability (L), while the other 
directives all direct and support a very robust capability.  Later to the issuance of the 
revised DDG 51 Class ROC/POE in 2003, the Navy Manpower Analysis Center 
(NAVMAC) removed all MIO workload, 2,057 weekly hours of Own Unit Support 
(OUS) from each DDG 51 Class SMD.  This was equivalent to removing 30 billets worth 
                                                 
39 Kevin Ray, “Identifying Capabilities Gaps in Shipboard Visit, Board, Search, Seizure (VBSS) 
Teams” Naval Post Graduate School, December 2010, http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=11019. 
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of workload from each DDG.  A VBSS event could have as many as ten boardings per 
event as the RHIB and team cycle among a group of dhows. 
The VBSS capability for surface ships may not be aligned to actual 
operational necessity, other than for contingency Level II operations, or the anticipation 
of more rigorous and potentially non-compliant events in support of new international 
sanctions. 
Within the current Navy command environment, DDG 51 Class ships are 
tasked to perform vigorous VBSS operations without the aid of special detachments.  
Commanding Officers and their crews feel the burden of conducting VBSS operations.  
These operations are additional workload the ship is not credited with and draw 
individuals from all divisions from the ship.  While the crewmembers are participating in 
extensive VBSS operations, they are not performing the work that generated their 
respective SMD billets in the first place.  Operating areas in the Persian Gulf and Horn of 
Africa, the teams perform VBSS frequently enough to mitigate the need for proficiency 
training. 
The Lockheed Martin study was conducted in 2007 exemplifying many of 
the problems experienced by many VBSS Boarding Officers.  It was a constant battle to 
get the approval for VBSS team members to be excused from divisional training, 
maintenance, and watches.  On many occasions I had to change my VBSS/MIO watch 
bill to accommodate a critical repair that took priority over the VBSS mission. Many of 
my VBSS team members had NECs that required them to be available onboard, so their 
divisions were often reluctant to allow them to leave the ship for VBSS/MIO operations, 
training, and schools. The 30 billets that were removed from the SMD by NAVMAC 
were just in one warfare area.  This number would likely be higher if the study included 
other warfare areas. The bottom line is that the ROC/POE is the document that outlines 
all of the U.S. Navy’s current capabilities, yet insufficient shipboard manning does not 
accurately reflect the ROC/POE. 
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B. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. What is the Current Visit Board Search and Seizure (VBSS) 
Structure, Work Requirements and Guidance in the Ship’s 
Manpower Document (SMD), and Could VBSS Non Shipboard 
Detachments be a Viable Alternative? 
a. Conclusions 
Current VBSS teams are organized to meet the requirements to conduct 
Level I and II boardings. The training that all teams receive applies to a non-compliant 
level, meaning that VBSS teams will avoid and/or evade contact with aggressors.  
Additionally, Navy ship COs would not intentionally send their shipboard boarding team 
into a non-compliant or opposed boarding.  These anticipated high risk situations are 
reserved for SOCOM subject matter experts.  Even so, boarding a foreign ship is still 
potentially dangerous on a number of fronts, requiring special precautions.  The issue 
raised in this study concerns both a lack of dedicated VBSS training dedicated for 
shipboard deployed VBSS teams, and a real and/or perceived disparity among VBSS 
teams in terms of uniformly maintained capabilities after certification. 
There is a generally accepted mindset that the VBSS/MIO mission is a 
collateral duty, and therefore does not need the equivalent attention as other traditional 
areas, e.g., 3-M, Air Defense, etc.  Although no known VBSS boarding team members 
have been injured accomplishing this mission, many VBSS experienced team members 
would likely disagree with the collateral duty mindset. 
The amount of man-hours a typical ship uses for the VBSS mission was 
determined to be 2,057 man hours per week.  These 2,057 man hours determined as own 
unit support was discarded from the Ship’s Manning Document by NAVMAC, removing 
30 billets from each destroyer. The Navy canceled the optimal manning experiment in 
2011 though the effects of the policy change are not clear.  If the U.S. Navy wants to 
continue to stress the importance of the VBSS/MIO warfare area, then why not fund it 
like a primary mission? For virtually no-cost, ship COs could be encouraged to prioritize 
and better support the VBSS training mission by ensuring their VBSS team has a chance 
to develop cohesion, trust and professionalism. 
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The U.S. Navy has historically and currently utilizes embarked units or 
detachments for many different warfare areas that require specialized training or skill 
sets. One example of embarked units in current operation is Navy Explosive Ordnance 
Disposal (EOD) teams.  These units embark and deploy with Carrier Strike Groups 
(CSG), but are not really ship’s company because they depart the ship post-deployment.  
These EOD detachments provide a specialized skill set that is mobile enough to be 
transferred to any other assets in the CSG. The NECC stood up VBSS level III boarding 
teams in 2006 and disbanded them in 2009 due to budgetary cuts. The Navy could have 
used these teams like EOD detachments deployed with CSGs.  Then, if a particular ship 
was tasked with a dedicated VBSS/MIO mission, the detachment could translocate to the 
affected area and conduct the VBSS mission without distracting shipboard personnel.  
Additionally, dedicated detachments would likely respond with greater confidence, safety 
and skill because this is their primary focus on which they are expertly trained and 
experienced, not a part-time fill-in. 
b. Recommendation 
N86 should direct MIO ROC/POE to change ROC element MOS 4.4 from 
Team (E) to Limit (L) in condition I and II The Navy also needs to stress to the 
leadership it is committed to the highest degree of readiness for all boarding teams in the 
fleet and this mission is not going to be going away and they need to give the members of 
the VBSS the time to train to retain their KSAs.  
2. What are the Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats 
when Comparing the Existing Versus the Alternative Programs? 
a. Conclusions 
(1)  VBSS teams operating since the early 1990s appear to have a 
high success rate with no known serious injuries. Teams are well-trained to conduct level 
I and II boardings which make up the majority of today’s boardings.  VBSS teams are 
multi-skilled and widely-dispersed around the globe, i.e., 12-person teams composed of 
multiple ratings on all Navy warships.  The Navy can assign any ship to conduct 
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boardings knowing it possesses that capability. Pirates may also be learning that where 
there is a U.S. Navy ship—a VBSS team is close. 
(2)  There is unwanted variability in terms of the quality of 
shipboard VBSS teams (likely due to a lack of priority for VBSS deployment training); 
and a lack of consistency of training conducted on Navy ships after VBSS certification.  
Measures have been put into place for VBSS to maintain these skill-sets to conduct Level 
I and II boardings. However, as with every other inspection that the Navy adds to the 
ships, these inspections are trained to as the come down the schedule.  Once the 
inspection is completed, the teams return back to their divisions and the Chain of 
Commands focus is on the next inspection. This creates an interrupted training plan for 
the VBSS team members. 
(3)  The Navy considers VBSS/MIO operations as a critical 
mission area and advertises that it is committed to protecting commerce around the globe 
however, VBSS is under-funded.  The U.S. Navy’s newest commercial slogan 
promulgates a “Global Force for Good” and leading the fight to maintain open sea lanes 
for commerce. However, per the 2007 Lockheed Martin study removing 2,057 man 
hours, approximately 30 sailors per DDG were removed from conducting this high-risk 
mission. 
(4)  Discussion.  The high-level IV, opposed or non-compliant 
missions are almost always conducted by Navy SEALS or other SOF teams. These are 
the boardings that involve weapons being fired and the possibility of injury or death.  The 
USCG Law Enforcement Detachment (LEDET) teams are very skilled in this area 
however, they are stretched thin and it might be difficult to use these teams based on 
sheer numbers. The LEDET community apparently is also seeing their mission area of 
responsibility (AOR) expanding without the funding to perform new AORs.   A separate 
alternative could be in using the USMC MEU SOC as boarding parties when embarked 
on amphibious ships. Expeditionary Strike Groups are constantly transporting Marines 
around the globe.  These highly dispersed, specialized Marines already have the training 
and skills to accommodate this somewhat atypical mission of boarding, searching and 
securing a foreign ship.  Marines are already required to get VBSS level IV qualified 
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prior to being deployed as a MEU SOC, and Marines conducting maritime raids is 
nothing new to the Navy.  Finally, the Marine option could alleviate some of the 
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